Finland’s comprehensive security model is an internationally recognized, whole-of-society preparedness framework that integrates all sectors—public authorities, private businesses, civil society organizations, and individual citizens—to maintain critical societal functions during crises. Rooted in the post-World War II Total Defence doctrine and continuously evolved since 2003, the model demonstrates how a small nation of 5.5 million people can achieve exceptional societal resilience through collaborative networks, shared responsibility, and systematic preparedness at all levels. It operates on the principle of locality, where each actor maintains their normal responsibilities even during emergencies, and emphasizes networked cooperation across society. Key features include the 72-hour home preparedness concept, regional preparedness networks such as EKTURVA, National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) pool organizations, mandatory and voluntary exercises, and a strong culture of trust and collaboration. The system has been tested and adapted through real-world crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, hybrid threats, and regional emergencies, highlighting both its strengths and areas for continued development.
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Finnish Comprehensive Security Model
General Information
ISIG
The Finnish comprehensive security model is a networked, whole-of-society framework that ensures societal resilience during crises through local responsibility, preparedness networks, exercises, and a culture of trust.
Finland's unique context shaped this model: a history of war (Winter War 1939-40, Continuation War 1941-44), 1,340km border with Russia, harsh Nordic climate, sparse population density, and high social trust (>90% trust in authorities). The model evolved from Total Defence concepts to address modern threats including cyber attacks, hybrid warfare, climate-related disasters, and supply chain disruptions. Recent events - COVID-19 pandemic, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Baltic Sea infrastructure damage - have accelerated system development. The 2025 Security Strategy for Society emphasizes stronger resilience, crisis response capabilities, and individual citizens' key role in security.
Needs Addressed
Finland faces multiple interconnected risks: extreme weather events (storms causing widespread power outages), cyber threats, hybrid influencing, potential military threats, supply chain vulnerabilities, and cascading infrastructure failures. The sparse population and long distances create challenges for emergency response. Traditional sector-specific preparedness proved insufficient for complex, cross-cutting crises. The need was to create a system where all societal actors understand their roles, can self-organize during disruptions, and maintain vital functions even when normal systems fail.
Finland's aging population requires special attention in preparedness planning. Recent immigration has created new challenges for inclusive preparedness communication - materials are now produced in 15+ languages. Rural elderly populations face particular vulnerabilities during power outages and extreme weather. The system struggles to fully integrate cultural minorities and new immigrant communities into preparedness networks.
Finland's preparedness governance is polycentric with no single coordinating body. The Ministry of Interior coordinates rescue services preparedness, while each ministry handles its sector. Regional State Administrative Agencies (AVI) coordinate at regional level. The Security Committee facilitates cross-sector cooperation nationally. Local implementation happens through 21 wellbeing services counties and 309 municipalities, following the principle that crises are managed at the lowest possible level.
Finland maintains comprehensive preparedness through: Security Strategy for Society (government resolution), National Risk Assessment, sectoral contingency plans, 45,000+ civil defense shelters (capacity for 3.6 million), mandatory preparedness exercises, voluntary business sector pools, and the 72-hour home preparedness recommendation. The system emphasizes continuous training, with National Defence Courses running since 1961.
Critical infrastructure protection is integrated into comprehensive security. Energy, telecommunications, water, and transport sectors participate in NESA pools for coordination. Backup systems exist but face limitations (e.g., reserve power insufficient for all needs). Digital infrastructure resilience has become a priority. Shelters can be activated within 72 hours. However, interdependencies create vulnerabilities - payment system failures during power outages affect fuel distribution, impacting essential services.
Engagement serves multiple purposes: building shared situational awareness, coordinating resources and capabilities, identifying interdependencies and vulnerabilities, developing joint solutions, creating trust and networks before crises, and fostering a culture of preparedness. The system recognizes that modern crises require capabilities beyond any single organization's capacity.
- Regional preparedness networks (e.g., EKTURVA in South Karelia)
- NESA pool organizations (sectoral public-private partnerships)
- National and Regional Defence Courses (4 times/year, 3-week programs)
- Joint exercises at multiple levels
- 72-hour preparedness training by certified instructors
- Preparedness cooperation committees
- Regular stakeholder meetings and situation briefings
- Digital platforms for information sharing
All actors maintain their statutory responsibilities while participating in collaborative planning and response. Businesses voluntarily join NESA pools but influence preparedness standards for their sectors. NGOs with statutory roles (e.g., Red Cross) have formal responsibilities; others participate voluntarily but shape regional preparedness through networks. Citizens influence through participation in exercises and feedback mechanisms, though the system remains largely authority-driven.
The system builds long-term resilience through: continuous training programs (National Defence Courses since 1961, regional courses since 1962), creating "preparedness champions" across society, peer learning in networks, regular exercises revealing vulnerabilities, certification programs for trainers (72-hour instructors), and embedding preparedness in organizational cultures. The goal is self-sustaining resilience where all actors can adapt independently while maintaining coordination.
Hazard Type
Geographical Scope - Nuts
Population Size
Population Density
Vulnerable Groups
Governance
Emergency Preparedness
Infrastructure Readiness
Engagement Level
Empowerment Level
Implementation
- Comprehensive Security Concept: All societal actors share responsibility for vital functions
- 72-Hour Preparedness: Citizens prepared to survive independently for 3 days minimum
- Regional Networks: Self-organizing preparedness networks like EKTURVA bringing together 30+ organizations
- NESA Pool System: Voluntary public-private partnerships for critical sectors
- Principle of Locality: Normal structures maintained during crises, managed at lowest level
- Trust-Based Cooperation: Leverages Finland's high social trust for voluntary participation
- Continuous Adaptation: System evolves with emerging threats (cyber, hybrid, climate)
- Multi-channel Communication: Preparedness information in 15+ languages, sign language
Finnish, Swedish (official languages), English, plus materials available in Russian, Estonian, Somali, Arabic, and 10+ other languages
Multiple organizations in networked implementation:
- Security Committee (national coordination)
- Ministry of Interior (rescue services preparedness)
- National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) (business continuity)
- Regional State Administrative Agencies (regional coordination)
- Wellbeing services counties (regional implementation)
- Finnish National Rescue Association (SPEK) (72-hour concept)
- Finnish Red Cross (statutory emergency support role)
- Regional preparedness networks
Finland has 60+ years of systematic preparedness development. National Defence Courses since 1961, comprehensive security evolution since 2003, tested through multiple crises. Organizations like SPEK have decades of experience in public preparedness education. Recent experiences (COVID-19, Ukraine war impacts) have accelerated learning and adaptation.
All ministries, Security Committee, Regional State Administrative Agencies, wellbeing services counties, municipalities, rescue services, police, defense forces, border guard Private Sector: Critical infrastructure operators, NESA pool members (energy, telecom, food, transport, finance, media companies) Civil Society: Finnish Red Cross, SPEK, voluntary fire brigades, 53 supporting NGOs, religious organizations Citizens: Through home preparedness, volunteer activities, participation in exercises
- Strategic Framework: Security Strategy for Society defines vital functions and responsibilities
- Risk Assessment: National and regional risk assessments identify priorities
- Network Formation: Regional actors form preparedness networks through local initiative
- Capability Mapping: Organizations identify resources, skills, dependencies
- Exercise Planning: Regular exercises test systems, build relationships
- Training Cascades: National→Regional→Local→Household preparedness training
- Continuous Improvement: After-action reviews, strategy updates, adaptation to new threats
- Communication: Multi-channel preparedness messaging, maintaining public awareness
- Human: Dedicated preparedness professionals in all major organizations, volunteer networks, certified trainers
- Financial: Government funding for core functions, NESA funding for business continuity, organizational self-funding for participation, EU project funding for development
- Technical: Exercise facilities, training materials, digital platforms, emergency supplies
- Time: Significant time investment for exercises, meetings, training (noted as a challenge)
- Social Capital: High trust, existing networks, cultural commitment to preparedness
- Continuous evolution since WWII, formalized comprehensive security from 2003
- 5-year strategy cycles (current 2025-2030)
- Annual implementation monitoring through Security Report for Society
- Ongoing activities: 4 National Defence Courses/year, regular regional exercises
- Rapid adaptation phases: COVID-19 response (2020-2023), post-Ukraine invasion (2022-present)
- Future development: Regional preparedness standardization project (2024-2026)
Experience of the Implementing Organisation in DRM
Target Audience
Resources Required
Timeframe & Phases
Participation Results
Challenges identified:
- Fragmentation: Multiple networks create inefficiencies → Solution: Regional preparedness development project for standardization
- Inclusivity gaps: Preparedness remains "elite concern," minorities underrepresented → Adaptation: Multi-language materials, targeted outreach
- Volunteer integration: System cannot absorb spontaneous/pop-up volunteers → Strategy: Developing volunteer registries and skill databases
- Resource limitations: Private sector participation costly → Approach: Emphasize mutual benefits, benchmarking opportunities
- Communication silos: Information gaps between levels → Response: Enhanced digital platforms, regular cross-level meetings
- Geographic disparities: Helsinki-centric activities → Solution: Strengthen regional networks, remote participation options
Comprehensive risk approach addressing: natural hazards (storms, floods, forest fires), technological risks (cyber, infrastructure failure), health security (pandemics), geopolitical risks (hybrid threats, supply disruptions), and cascading failures. Mitigation through redundancy (multiple actors per function), diversity (different types of organizations), flexibility (adaptable structures), and continuous learning (regular exercises, after-action reviews). Special focus on slow-onset risks like climate change impacts on infrastructure resilience.
Risk & Mitigation Plan
Scalability and Sustainability
The model sustains itself through:
- Legal Foundation: Emergency Powers Act, Rescue Act create statutory obligations
- Institutional Embedding: Preparedness integrated into normal organizational operations
- Financial Sustainability: Mixed funding - government core, organizational contributions, project supplements
- Cultural Sustainability: Preparedness as "Finnish way of life," generational transfer through education
- Network Effects: Value increases with participation, creating incentives
- Continuous Renewal: Regular exercises, training maintain engagement
- Political Support: Cross-party consensus on comprehensive security
The Finnish model demonstrates both scalability and limitations:
Scalable Elements:
- Network approach adaptable to different administrative levels
- 72-hour concept applicable universally with local customization
- Pool model for public-private cooperation
- Exercise-based learning methodology
Context-Dependent Elements:
- High trust society enables voluntary cooperation
- Small population facilitates personal networks
- Historical experience creates cultural readiness
- Nordic welfare state provides resource base
- Digital platforms for information sharing (mentioned by interviewees)
- Online training systems (72hours.fi website and online courses)
- Multi-channel crisis communication systems
- Development of new training initiatives like VARY for school teachers
- Creation of situational awareness platforms (mentioned in government documents) However, detailed information about specific technologies used in the Finnish comprehensive security system is not publicly documented in the available sources..
- 72-hour preparedness instructor training: 65€/hour (subsidized rate set by SPEK)
- Infrastructure: Finland maintains 45,000+ civil defense shelters
- Mixed funding model confirmed: government funding for core functions, organizational self-funding for participation, EU project funding for development (e.g., CORE project)
- National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) provides funding for business continuity and 72-hour preparedness communication Specific budget figures are not publicly available in the reviewed sources.
- Personnel: Each major organization has preparedness coordinators/managers (confirmed through interviews)
- Regular exercises: National level (4 National Defence Courses/year), regional exercises, sectoral exercises through NESA pools
- Communication: SPEK coordinates 72-hour preparedness communication with NESA funding
- Maintenance: Shelters must be available within 72 hours notice
- Voluntary participation: Most private sector and NGO participation is voluntary, reducing direct costs but requiring time investment Specific cost breakdowns are not available in public sources.
Finland's decades of comprehensive security development reveal that high social trust enables voluntary cooperation, but trust must be continuously earned through transparent action. While shared wartime history initially motivated preparedness, new generations need contemporary relevance - connecting resilience to modern threats like cyber attacks and climate change. The system's strength lies in personal networks across organizations, yet this creates fragility when key people leave. Despite "whole-of-society" ambitions, marginalized groups often remain peripheral, requiring deliberate inclusion efforts. Regular exercises expose critical gaps between paper plans and reality, like payment systems failing during power outages. The 72-hour home preparedness concept proves that small individual actions multiply into massive system capacity. Clear role definitions matter more than perfect coordination - ambiguity kills efficiency in crises. Most importantly, preparedness isn't a destination but a continuous process requiring sustained commitment, as threats evolve faster than bureaucracies can adapt. Finland increasingly recognizes that modern crises cross borders, balancing self-reliance with international cooperation.