A set of low-cost, solar-powered monitoring stations built from open hardware and linked to a web platform and messaging alerts. Practical Action piloted it from 2016 in Lurigancho-Chosica, Lima, together with community brigades and local authorities.
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Qawaq: Low-Cost Climate Monitoring for Flood and Mudflow Early Warning
General Information
ISIG
A low-cost network of sensors built from open hardware that sends flood and mudflow alerts to officials and community leaders in Chosica, Peru.
Practical Action developed the system, called Qawaq (meaning "the one who looks"), from 2016 with residents, the Lurigancho-Chosica municipality and the national civil defence institute (INDECI), to cover micro-watersheds and variables that were not being monitored. Each station combines Arduino and Raspberry Pi microcontrollers with solar power, records rainfall, soil saturation and images, and transmits readings through mobile data to a web platform, from which notices go out by SMS and messaging apps.
The approach follows three steps: study the gaps in the four elements of early warning, map the low-cost technologies available, and design stations to fill the gaps. The brief estimates about US$330 per site, with data transmission at US$20 a month. Five stations were set up in Chosica.
Chosica is the capital of the Lurigancho-Chosica district, in the Rímac valley about 20 km east of Lima, and is prone to flooding and to huaicos, the local name for mudflows and landslides. The district had between about 241,000 and 256,000 inhabitants at the 2017 census, over roughly 236 km². The brief, citing the national risk estimation centre CENEPRED, says roughly three in ten people are highly susceptible to these events. Indirect effects such as cut roads disrupt food supply and trade with the big cities.
In Peru, INDECI is the national civil defence institute. In Chosica it worked alongside the municipality and a Korean cooperation agency (KOICA), which separately put in place its own set of advanced stations in neighbouring micro-watersheds. The solution brief says early warning systems sometimes have limited impact because their technical, community and organisational parts are run separately.
Hazard Type
Geographical Scope - Nuts
Geographical Scope
Population Size
Population Density
Needs Addressed
Early warning systems lose effectiveness when equipment, community action and institutional coordination are run separately. In Chosica this showed up in three ways:
- Monitoring gaps. Some variables were not measured, some areas were not covered and some data were not processed. Big historical events were remembered locally, but few robust records existed.
- Poor information flow. Hydrological information was not always useful or timely, and response bodies lacked channels to communicate with one another.
- High cost. Conventional climate stations are expensive to buy and maintain, so too few are installed to cover the territory.
The technology must serve those at greatest risk and involve them.
In Chosica, Practical Action led the pilot with community volunteers and brigades, the municipality of Lurigancho-Chosica and INDECI, while KOICA ran a related project. A leaders’ network for the Rímac watershed (the brief calls it the Network of Resilient Leaders) was linked to the system as an additional channel. Roles were shared among a non-profit, local government, national civil defence, a donor agency and community groups. The sources do not describe a formal governance structure for the system itself.
Elsewhere, the system can be set up in two ways. An NGO or technical partner can lead with the municipality, civil defence and local groups, as in Chosica. A municipal risk office or civil defence body can also run it with local partners. In both cases someone has to build and maintain the stations, someone has to host them, someone has to own the platform and the alerts, and a response body has to act on the warnings.
Basic preparedness describes the starting point in Chosica. The area had recurrent events and local memory of past floods, but the brief describes monitoring, information flow and communication between response bodies as fragmented. Community brigades were set up as part of the process.
Elsewhere, the system fits places with a similar starting point: recurrent floods or mudflows, few measured variables and weak links between technical bodies and communities. Where plans and warning systems already exist, the stations can add data to them. The system does not replace preparedness and the technology is not enough on its own, so each site also needs a body that can respond to alerts, such as brigades, civil defence or the municipality.
In Chosica the system needed mobile network coverage and smartphones, a site to host each station (such as a volunteer’s roof or a hillside), and solar power, which avoids dependence on the electricity grid during disasters. The stations can also link locally by radiofrequency modules. A web platform and messaging accounts are needed to share data and alerts.
The minimum is a mobile data signal, or a local radio link, and a safe place for each station. Solar power means the grid is not needed. Where electricity, fixed internet or an existing monitoring network is available, the stations can connect to them or add coverage to them. In places with weak or no mobile coverage, the communication channels would have to change, and the brief does not say how well the system would work there.
To make sure the monitoring technology reflects local knowledge and needs and connects to community response, so that the system works as a social process and not only as equipment.
Gathering local knowledge alongside technical data during the gap study; stations hosted on the roofs of community volunteers; community brigades making simple rain gauges; a leaders’ network used as a communication channel; and coordination with local authorities and civil defence.
The one documented case of local input shaping the design is the choice of very fine time resolution, with a reading each minute instead of each hour, which was adopted on local suggestion. Volunteers host stations, and brigades’ hand-made gauges contributed to technical monitoring. Practical Action designed and built the hardware and software. The brief does not say who sets alert thresholds, who decides where stations go, or how many residents took part.
Community brigades were established as part of the process and produced their own gauges, and a leaders’ network was linked to the system. The brief gives no numbers or training details. Because the equipment is open and was built in-house, it can be adapted at little cost by changing parts of the code.
Vulnerable Groups
Governance
Emergency Preparedness
Engagement Level
Empowerment Level
Implementation
Stations are modular and cheap, built from open hardware and software, with 3D-printed sensor covers and solar panels. They measure rainfall and soil saturation by micro-watershed and take images, to fill gaps in conventional coverage. Data reach a web platform that supports two-way communication with officials and community leaders, and common messaging apps are used alongside SMS. The designers could change the equipment quickly because they had built it. The brief also says the low-cost stations are accurate enough to complement a high-technology network. It gives no accuracy figures, only one day’s rainfall at five stations in the area (13 to 38 mm), which shows how much rainfall differs between micro-watersheds.
Spanish
Practical Action, through its Latin America regional office in Lima, with the Lurigancho-Chosica municipality, INDECI and community volunteers. KOICA ran a related high-technology station project.
Transferable implementers: NGOs, municipal risk offices or national civil defence bodies working with a team that has electronics and software skills, such as a university, technical institute or meteorological service.
Practical Action is a development organisation that belongs to a multi-country flood resilience alliance, and it ran the Chosica pilot from 2016.
Any implementer needs experience with community-based risk work, partnerships with the local authority and civil defence, and technical capacity to build and maintain the equipment.
Practical Action; community volunteers who host stations; community brigades; the Rímac watershed leaders’ network; the municipality of Lurigancho-Chosica; INDECI; and KOICA, which ran a separate station project.
- Study the current situation: identify needs and strengths in the four elements of early warning (risk knowledge, monitoring and warning, dissemination and communication, response capacity), using technical data and local knowledge together with community-strengthening work.
- Map the technology options: look at mass-market connectivity (mobile network, wireless, radiofrequency) and at low-cost open hardware and software such as 3D printers, Arduino, Raspberry Pi and open-source web platforms.
- Design the stations and information system: build modular low-cost stations to measure unmeasured variables or cover unmonitored areas, and link them to a platform that processes data and shares warning levels between authorities and residents.
- Install and run: set stations on volunteers’ roofs and in high areas of the hillsides and monitor at fine time resolution. Qawaq was used this way in Chosica from 2016.
- Build the social side: set up community brigades, produce simple gauges, link a leaders’ network, and coordinate with official entities. The brief states the technology is not self-sufficient without these.
Human: a team with electronics, software and community-work skills; volunteers to host stations; brigades.
Technical: sensors, microcomputers, solar panels, 3D printing, mobile data connection, web platform.
Financial: the brief estimates about US$330 per site, with data at US$20 a month. The pilot relied on an external organisation for design and support, and volunteers contributed sites and time.
The brief sets out three ordered design steps and describes the pilot from 2016 through the 2017 rainy season. It gives no dates or duration for each phase, and a 2017 article by Practical Action’s alliance partner says the equipment was installed in late 2016. Proposals to extend the experience were being prepared in 2018.
Experience of the Implementing Organisation in DRM
Resources Required
Timeframe & Phases
Participation Results
The solution brief’s main lesson is that technical, organisational and community processes should be coordinated, not run side by side. The most notable result of the 2017 rainy season, in its words, was combining local know-how with technical-scientific knowledge. Equipment should be chosen to serve those at greatest risk, and building it in-house makes quick adjustments possible. Low-cost stations also proved a useful complement to a high-technology network, according to the authors, who provide no measurements. The technology on its own is not enough, and response capacity and coordination between official and local bodies need their own work.
Conventional stations are costly, so the team built its own modular ones from open parts. Power cuts often occur during disasters, so the stations use solar panels. Monitoring was set to one reading per minute, rather than per hour, on local suggestions, and the change needed only code edits. Because technology alone does not produce an effective system, the team added brigades, simple gauges and a leaders’ network.
The brief links specific problems to specific responses: expensive equipment (low-cost open hardware), power loss during emergencies (solar panels), few robust data (more variables, finer time resolution and extra micro-watershed stations), and separation between technical and community parts (brigades, leaders’ network and coordination with official entities). It does not address maintenance, data quality checks, equipment theft or who responds to a false alarm.
Risk & Mitigation Plan
Scalability and Sustainability
No public information on the sustainability model was found in the sources reviewed. Based on the available information, it can be inferred that continuation depends on funding for data transmission and upkeep, technical support from Practical Action or a partner, and adoption by the municipality or INDECI. The brief mentions that proposals to extend the experience were being prepared in 2018.
The stations are modular, the hardware and software are open, and the brief lists comparable low-cost designs elsewhere that can be replicated or adapted, such as a UCAR-USAID low-cost station for data-poor regions, a school weather station and an Imperial College landslide monitoring project. What scales is the three-step method and the station design. What must be localised is the choice of variables, the sites, the communication channels (which depend on mobile coverage), who receives alerts, and the local response arrangements. The approach needs a team with electronics and software skills and willing local authorities.
The system uses a wireless sensor network of low-cost microcontrollers and microcomputers, connected by mobile data and local radio links, feeding free web platforms and messaging apps. Alerts go out by the platform and SMS. Smart or adaptive features are not described, so the higher level is not ticked. The brief does not explain how alerts are triggered.
The brief lists, per site: support structure US$100, Raspberry Pi and parts US$55, sensors US$15, 3D-printing filament US$60 and photovoltaic system US$80, which adds to US$310 for hardware. It gives an approximate total of US$330 per site, which seems to include one month of data. A community brigade’s hand-made rain gauge costs about US$3. No public information on staff, design, training or platform costs was found.
Data transmission is listed at US$20 per month per site, about US$240 a year. No public information on other operating costs was found. They may include maintenance and replacement of parts, platform hosting, support to brigades and technical staff time.
Low purchase cost and open designs reduce dependence on suppliers and make repairs and changes easier, but data transmission adds a running cost of about US$20 per site each month that someone has to cover. The solution does not describe a maintenance plan, ownership of the platform after the pilot, or who pays for the stations over time. Extending the experience depended on proposals to government or international cooperation agencies. No public information was found on whether that funding was obtained.